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Ich hebe ihr noch immer
Sie raubt mich heute noch den Sinn usw
Lexikalische Fehler sind der falsche Gebrauch des Wortes in Verbindung mit 
anderen Im Song ,,Deutschlehrerm“ smgt man dock ich кат zu spat, denn sie 
war leider schon vergebens statt des notigen vergeben Im Satz ihre Haul weicher 
m e Samt muss statt als statt wie gebraucht werden Diesen Fehler kann auch zu den 
grammatische gehoren
Stilistische Fehler smd der Stilbruch, was emen bestimmten komischen Effekt 
schafft So konnen wir sehen, dass die Fehler sowohl auf bewusster, als auch auf 
unterbewusster Ebenen entstehen kann Da sie der Norm entgegengesetzt smd, smd 
sie die Abweichung von dieser Norm und konnen auf den ersten Blick mcht erklart 
werden, aber bei der weiteren Betrachtung konnen sie rationalisiert werden
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THE VISEGRAD GROUP: IS COMMON POLICY TOWARDS
RUSSIA POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY?
Belgorod State National Research University
The article is devoted to the Visegrad Group that includes such “new” EU member - 
states, as Poland, Hungary, the Czech and Slovak Republics The authors try to reveal a 
possibility of their consolidated policy towards Russia within the European Union They 
come to a conclusion that, despite differences of interests, the common approach is possible 
m regard to Eastern dimension of ENP and especially on energy security matters, though it 
will not have a clearly binding character
The Visegrad Group (V4) was established in 1991 as a group of Central 
European countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and after 1993 the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia) to achieve the common aims -  to overcome the Communist 
past and enter the Western institutions, that is, first of all NATO and EU When the 
V4 countries had become member-states of NATO and EU, there appeared a major 
question did it make sense to move forward together and, if yes, m what direction 
The Visegrad Group and in principle the whole EU have answered in the 
affirmative the first part of the question, but, in our opinion, the second one is still a
matter of debate even in 2011, the year of V4 s 20th anniversary, despite a number 
of V4 declarations
The Visegrad Group has undergone definite transformations, and this process 
is still underway Since 2000 the socio-cultural dimension has been developing due 
to establishment of the International Visegrad Fund that sponsors educational and 
cultural exchange between V4 countries and their neighbours There are certain 
achievements m this sphere, and a number of scholars [for example, Dangerfield
2008] stress that it was the Visegrad Group that contributed mostly to the revival of 
such geopolitical region as “Central Europe”, true, a bit modified Furthermore, in 
May 2004 V4 countries signed new declaration revising the Visegrad Group 
priorities after joining the EU -  the stress was shifted from internal socio-economic 
development to external affairs There have been already some initiatives in the 
international politics, and V4 has been trying to work out its identity m this sphere 
In Russia, little attention is given now to V4, and there is a feeling that after 
the integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures the Visegrad Group member-states' 
cooperation has been reduced to cultural, educational exchanges and cross-border 
cooperation administered by the International Visegrad Fund Closer look at the V4 
countries activities does not confirm this assumption It is possible to reveal that 
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and Eastern neighbours as such are 
getting more and more important for the V4 and that the Ukraine is especially 
relevant as a big neighbouring country with EU and NATO aspirations For 
example, V4 was an important forum to discuss a significant project to deepen ENP 
-  Eastern Partnership (EaP) -  that was launched in May 2009, and Ukraine is a key 
country for Eastern Partnership But, oddly enough, there is no more or less definite 
common approach to such an important neighbour as Russia
Meanwhile, there are a number of things uniting the V4 countries in regard to 
the Russian Federation For example, their vast energy resources import from 
Russia, common neighborhood, suspicion arising from the times o f the Soviet bloc 
But these uniting factors have not yet been translated mto the consistent policy for 
the whole V4 Obviously, it is due to the fact that V4 countries have different 
priorities concerning their Eastern neighbourhood and Russia in particular 
However, there are signs that V4 countries are now well aware that common 
approach to the Russian Federation is necessary For instance, it was pointed out in 
the Czech EU Presidency Program in 2009 that common EU approach is needed 
This task is not easy to solve in the whole EU (if at all possible), so, the first 
attempt could be done withm the Visegrad Group
Many analysts rightly argue that Poland is a real leader of the Visegrad Group 
first and foremost because of her comprehensive and clear policy towards Eastern 
neighbours, ability to come up with new policy initiatives and strong regional 
ambitions Therefore, the Polish policy is especially relevant and interesting for us 
Of course, it is necessary to consider this matter taking mto account 
peculiarity of V4 cooperation One of the few Russian scholars of Visegrad Group 
I N Tarasov talks about a ‘Visegrad model of international cooperation’ Among its 
specific features he stresses certain freedom m foreign policy priorities, application
of integration methods of cooperation only where possible, cooperation projects 
does not necessary concern all the Group member-states, certain cooperation areas 
are not addressed at the V4 format at all, rather in EU or NATO [Tarasov 2008]
The Polish policy towards Russia
The Polish scholar Lena Kolarska-Bobmska discussing challenges of the 
Polish foreign policy m 2004 pointed out that the foreign policy-making mechanism 
would Europeanize and, as a result, there would be less agreement on foreign 
policy-making and decisions m the country [Sergeev 2006] When we consider 
Poland s policy towards Russia, it is mostly true The policy towards the Russian 
Federation was the issue over which it was especially easy to notice conflicting 
opinions of major decision-makers m foreign policy sphere after 2007, when 
Donald Tusk has become the Prime Minister of Poland The differences were even 
among the top officials -  between the late President Lech Kaczynski and the Prime 
Minister But these differences were mostly determined by the fact that the former 
stressed the Polish sovereignty in the EU and at the same time wanted direct EU 
involvement m the Pohsh-Russian disputes, while the latter wanted more 
Europeanization of the country, but pointed out the necessity to develop bilateral 
dialogue between Poland and Russia that was to be a certain marker for the EU 
authorities concerning Poland s ability to settle difficult problems and make 
contribution to stability in the region Donald Tusk managed to pursue his line 
despite the opposition from the President So, it is not surprising that the institutions 
of the Pohsh-Russian collaboration, that have been created earlier (e g Committee 
on strategy of the Polish-Russian cooperation, Business-Forum, etc ), started to 
work only after 2007 [Vasilenko 2009], intergovernmental contacts have been also 
intensified In his interview to US “Foreign Policy” journal the Polish foreign 
minister Radoslaw Sikorski mentioned m November 2009 that the Pohsh-Russian 
agreements concluded then “could not have been signed before” [Sikorski 2009]
After the notorious events of April 2010 when the President Lech Kaczynski 
and considerable part of the Polish elite died in the air crash near Smolensk 
Bronislaw Komorowski was elected as his successor He and Donald Tusk are not 
only members of one party -  “Civic Platform”, but also adherents of more or less 
similar policy in the EU and towards Russia At the same time, as Oleg Nemensky 
states, due to little interest of Komorowski to foreign policy issues Donald Tusk, 
along with Radoslaw Sikorski, will become more influential in this sphere 
[Nemetski http //russ ru/Mirovaya-povestka] That s why the present Poland's 
Russian policy of “reconciliation” is more consistent, though its opponents are 
looking forward to the parliamentary elections in late 2011 However, this policy to 
Russia is more a matter of tactics than strategy
Poland s strategic interest in regard to Russia can be rendered by the Polish 
expert Marek Menkiszak s words that “Poland would like to see Russia being 
similar to the EU” Here the Russian political development is especially relevant for 
Poland It is easy to notice that the political situation in Russia is under close 
scrutiny of the Polish government, as weil as experts and mass media The present 
political regime in Russia is termed 'soft authoritarianism’ [Rogoza 2009] This is,
as before, considered a negative tendency ruling out close cooperation, as well as 
threatening RP security Therefore, Poland and Russia can only try to find the areas 
where cooperation is possible, at the same time RP is willing to use every 
opportunity to defend its interests, if different from Russia s -  on bilateral and 
especially on EU level Thus, the room for Polish-Russian cooperation is not big At 
the same time, the areas of conflicting interests can be clearly identified -  first of all 
energy security issues (esp gas supplies) and common neighborhood, not to 
mention historical disputes that are often used by politicians from both sides
Meanwhile, the Polish government already prior to RP accession to the EU 
was determined to become a policy-maker m the EU, not a policy-taker, what was 
inevitable m the course of the accession negotiations The only possibility to 
achieve this goal was “to play an important role in shaping the EU eastern policy” -  
“one of the Union s strategic objectives” [http //www poland go\ pi] The Poland s 
input was supposed to be the Polish expertise on the region That s why 
significance of the Eastern neighbours (Ukraine, Belorussia, Russia and Moldova) 
for Poland has grown a lot After 2004 Eastern dimension of the EU neighbourhood 
policy has become a matter of lively discussion by the Polish think tanks, mass 
media and government agencies The Polish government even came up with some 
successful initiatives, m particular, m EU visa policy (e g postponement of visa 
introduction) To a certain extent, Polish Eastern policy within EU was successful -  
after a while the country was m principle recognized as a player able to come up 
with important ideas towards the Eastern neighbours Tusk s focus on 
Europeanization brought considerable progress -  Poland learnt a lesson how to 
promote her initiatives at the EU level The result was and adoption and realization 
of the Polish-Swedish Eastern Partnership discussed earlier at the V4 level as the 
EU policy
However, Poland s policy towards such a neighbour as Russia is the most 
complicated matter Here all more significant member-states (France, Germany and 
UK) have their own agenda m regard to Russia, and Polish opinion is not among the 
influential ones However, Donald Tusk s policy of dialogue with Russia is 
received much more favourably m Brussels, than Kaczynski s uncompromising 
stand -  this is a good ground for Poland s more involvement m the EU Russian 
policy negotiations That s why the Polish government during its EU Presidency 
starting in July 2011 wants to contribute to conclusion of new EU-Russia 
agreement
At the same time the Polish approach to policy towards Russia can be 
rendered by Radoslaw Sikorski s words “ the more you talk to Russia, the more 
you should talk to Russia s neighbours, who sometimes feel vulnerable ” 
[Sikorski 2009] And here the V4 format proves to be helpful
V4 countries" priorities towards Russia: energy security and common 
neighbourhood
The best way to reveal every V4 country s Russian policy priorities and the 
differences between the countries m question, as well as a possibility of a common 
approach is to look closer at the issues that are considered to be V4 major
consolidating factors in regard to Russia -  energy security and common 
neighborhood
Energy security Here we focus mainly on gas supplies matters as the most 
relevant, because this share of Russian fuel exports is bigger to the region and more 
connected with politics RP has been active on this issue for quite some time 
Poland s “Strategy of National Security” of 2007 stresses among major security 
threats Russia s use of energy resources factor as a means to discriminate a number 
of EU and NATO member-states [Strategia 2007], implying that RP is among 
the discriminated countries With this in mind, the Polish politicians keep stressing 
the importance of energy sources and transit routes diversification for the whole EU 
m order to decrease dependence on Russia, especially on gas import Poland 
imports appr 60% of her gas from Russia [http //www energy-regulators eu], while 
having 30 % from her own deposits and developing big projects on shale gas 
extraction [Polland www washmgtonpost com]
The Polish government was not that much concerned about oil import from the 
Russian Federation, as the crude oil market is more developed -  therefore, Poland 
could find substitute import m case of crisis Though after the recent developments 
in North Africa this possibility is not very likely RP is strongly opposed to the 
Russian projects on gas transit to Europe that avoid Poland -  the South Stream and 
especially the Nord Stream that was once called by Lech Kaczynski even another 
‘Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact” During the Polish Presidency m the Visegrad Group 
from June 2008 to June 2009 the energy security issues were high on the agenda in 
different meetings in V4 and some V4+ formats, and the Polish side was fairly 
successful in raising its V4 partners concerns on energy matters, as well as in 
finding support from non-V4 countries [The presidents 2008] But here we think 
that Russian-Ukraiman gas crisis m January 2009 that strongly affected Central 
European countries was somehow more persuasive than Poland s activities
These two factors influenced the Czech stand on energy security The Czechs 
initially were not active on this issue In fact they depend on Russia a lot in gas 
supplies (the smallest estimate -  58,8 %) [The Czech 2010] However, up to the 
time of their EU Presidency in 2009 the energy security has become a priority for 
the Czechs [Program 2009] Not surprisingly, the Polish experts gave very 
positive assessment of the Czechs action m the European Council on the Nabucco 
Pipeline which decreases dependence on Russia At present the Czech leadership 
even seek direct contacts with Azerbaijan concerning natural gas and oil -  m May 
2011 the Czech President Vaclav Klaus for the first time visited that country On 
the whole there is a consensus on the matter among different political groups m CR, 
despite political instability m the country
Until 2009, Hungary and Slovakia have not demonstrated much concern with 
this matter Though it does not mean that these two countries can even to a 
minimum degree consolidate their policies, as there is a serious conflict between 
them about rights of, correspondent^, Hungarian and Slovak minorities However, 
in that year these countries stand on energy matters started to evolve Slovakia
depends almost completely on gas import from Russia -  the biggest percentage in 
the V4 (98 %) [National 2010]
However, up to the Russian-Ukramian gas conflict of 2009 there was no sign of 
concern m the Slovak government about this IN  Tarasov examining attitude of 
different political parties towards Russia m V4 countnes reveals the highest level of 
'loyalty’ (understood as favourable attitude) to Russia among the Slovak political 
elite [Tarasov 2008 144] But the Slovak Republic was the most affected by the gas 
conflict m question, that s why her policy started to drift closer to that of Poland and 
the Czech Republic Dunng the year of Slovak V4 Presidency ending m June 2011 
the Slovak authonties promoted the question of energy secunty [Declaration 2011] 
Hungary is, in our opinion, the most successful m stressing pragmatism and 
economy in bilateral relations with the Russian Federation This country imports 
appr 55 % of gas from Russia [Hungarian 2010], therefore the gas conflict 
between Russia and Ukraine lead to anxiety among Hungarians At the same time 
the Hungarian government supports the South Stream project One of the ways to 
diversification of gas supplies is also through direct contacts with Azerbaijan, as 
well as shale gas extraction Thus, now the gap between Hungary, SR and Poland, 
CR on gas matters is significantly smaller
Therefore, the external factor (gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine and 
subsequent instability m their relations over gas matters) and, to a certain degree, 
Poland's policy helped V4 come closer on the issue It has become especially 
visible in the period of 2009-2011 Thus, energy matters have become a real 
example of V4 member-states sectoral cooperation The cooperation in this area is 
closely connected with V4 activities on the EaP realization, as the measures to 
enhance energy security in the region include close involvement of key EaP partner 
countries like Ukraine and Moldova (e g their membership in the Energy 
Community) Meanwhile, the situation m the world (instability in North Africa and 
nuclear crisis in Japan) is likely to result in an increase in gas consumption, 
including, of course, V4 countries
Common neighborhood_ Of V4 member-states only Poland has common 
border with Russia (the Kaliningrad region) This is one of the factors that explain 
why RP is the most anxious in V4 about relations with Russia Since 2004, and 
even earlier, Poland has been stressing the importance of Eastern neighbors for the 
EU, considering itself a bridge between EU and the Eastern neighborhood The 
Polish V4 Presidency was clearly the time when RP strove to promote the Eastern 
dimension of the ENP, and it had strong support of the Czechs -  on the initiative of 
“Eastern Partnership” (EaP) presented to the EC together with Sweden RP, being 
very active m initiating different V4+ formats, organized the first V4+ Russia 
consultations of MFA experts on EaP m January 2009 m Warsaw Meanwhile, 
Poland adds certain military component to V4+ cooperation, which stretches further 
than EaP [Resolution 2011] So, there will be a V4 “combat corps’ with 
participation of the Ukrainian military In fact, up to the recent time other V4 
countnes have not been very much concerned about Russia as an EU neighbor, and 
developed their relations with the Russian Federation through bilateral contacts
However, in recent years the Czechs demonstrate much enthusiasm about working 
out EU neighborhood and Russian policy As a Czech expert Elsa Tulmets states, 
the present Czech approach to the Eastern neighborhood could be to a certain extent 
prompted by the Polish Eastern policy [Tulmets 2008] The Czech government even 
tried to promote its own initiative m regard to Eastern neighbors [Mimsterstvo
2008] They have done much work on promoting the program for Eastern 
neighborhood in their V4 Presidency, and the Polish government invited the Czechs 
for consultations about details of the “Eastern Partnership” in October 2008
On the whole both countries -  Poland and the Czech Republic -  have ambition 
to be policy-makers m EU neighborhood policy Though, RP here is definitely more 
able due to a number-of-years effort That s why the Polish government mostly do 
not to promote their initiatives m this sphere with the Czechs The Poles try to make 
full use of the EU policy-making mechanism They learned that for an initiative to 
become a success they need support of an “old” member, and it is better not look 
like a “new” members initiative That proved effective m case of “Eastern 
Partnership” And the Swedish EU Presidency Programme (in the second half of
2009) specifically mentioned its particular focus on implementation of EaP [Work
2009] Thus, in spite of common priorities m the sphere it is unlikely to have
many joint actions here, RP and CR are rather competitors
Hungary is also interested m formulating policy towards neighbors, however, 
different priorities are evident She demonstrated her interest in the EaP, and on the 
whole gave her support to the initiative Hungary does not underline its anti- 
Russian character, rather stresses her interest m Ukraine, to be more precise, 
Hungarian minority m that country, as she wants all the ethnic Hungarians to be m 
the EU Hungarian V4 Presidency priorities clearly revealed the differences Back 
m May 2009 the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs Peter Balazs stressed that 
there should be a balance between V4 policy towards Western Balkans and Eastern 
neighbors [Hungary 2009]
At the same time Hungary s V4 Presidency Programme demonstrated her 
ambition for V4 policy-making in the East that specifically included fairly detailed 
V4+ Russia format [Hungarian 2008] The Hungarian government tried to make 
use of their relatively good relations with Russia to make a difference Though this 
approach did not prove effective m V4, Hungary mostly continued this policy 
during her EU Presidency Slovakia s priorities m regard to the neighborhood are 
closer to those of Hungary She has also approved EaP, because has a common 
border with the Ukraine, and there is a Slovak minority there At the same time 
Slovak politicians m V4 meetings tend to underline the Southern dimension, 
namely Western Balkans [The Presidents 2008] Up to the recent time the 
Slovak statesmen were the most involved among V4 countries in consultations with 
the Russian officials on bilateral relations The situation does not seem to change 
soon The Slovak government keep stressing the bilateral format of their relations 
with Russia m 2010-2011, though are now more inclined to discuss energy security 
issues in multilateral format [Slovak 2011]
Meanwhile, the crisis m North Africa undermined the position V4 countries 
concerning the Eastern dimension of the ENP The EU policy towards Southern 
neighbours is being strongly criticized, especially by the most affected member - 
states, and the EU institutions have been developing a revised version of ENP V4 
countries backed inter aha by Germany launched a serious ‘counteroffensive’ to 
proposals on downgrading Eastern neighbourhood and m particular transfer of EaP 
funds to Southern neighbours [Letter to 2011] One of the Central European 
countnes major arguments is that this will result m an increase of Russia s 
influence in the region
Thus, it is possible to reveal that V4 countries have on the whole similar 
priorities m energy matters concerning natural gas which is a significant 
consolidating factor in regard to Russia The external factor helped the countries in 
question realize their common interests concerning Eastern neighbourhood It is 
worth noting that the first big successful initiative of a “new” EU member-state 
Poland (together with Sweden) to development of which all the V4 countries 
contributed -  “Eastern Partnership” -  in many ways resembles V4 cooperation 
format So, it is not surprising that many analysts talked about EaP as an Eastern 
European Visegrad Group
At the same time V4 want to be perceived as such and promote their 
experience to EaP countries If the EU adopts the policy lessening the role of the 
Eastern dimension of ENP, V4 countries and first of all Poland undermine their 
niche of a bridge and interpreter of good EU practices to Eastern neighbours This 
can decrease V4 countries influence not only in the East, but also on other aspects 
of EU decision-making That s why Poland who will preside in the EU in the 
second half of 2011 managed to obtain active V4 support for EaP on the EU level 
Conclusions
Poland, the most active V4 country, and Russia have limited sphere of 
cooperation At the same time under the present Polish leadership are inclined to 
make full use of the existing cooperation opportunities The conflicting Russian- 
Polish interests can be clearly identified -  first of all energy security and common 
neighbourhood These conflicting interests could be the basis for working out 
among V4 member-states the common approach to Russia and strengthen their 
influence on EU-Russia relations, because all V4 countries are dependent on 
Russian energy resources (first of all gas) supplies, though to a different degree, and 
have their interests in regard to the Eastern neighbours
Poland has an interest m working out common V4 approach toward Russia 
that was clearly demonstrated in the time of the Polish Presidency in the Visegrad 
Group The gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine and, to a certain degree, 
Poland s policy helped V4 come closer on the issue It has become especially 
visible in the period of 2009-2011
The “Eastern Partnership” that was initiated by RP together with Sweden for 
six Eastern neighbors, except Russia, at first demonstrated that there can be a real 
coalition on the Russian policy rather with Sweden and the Baltic states than with
V4 member-states, the Visegrad Group can be a good forum for preliminary 
consultations for a serious foreign policy initiative, but not a basis for a coalition in 
the EU to promote it However, recent developments in the EU provoked by the 
crisis in North Africa helped V4 countnes realize the significance of EaP for them 
both m the European Union and m the East, especially m regard to Russia
Therefore, at present there is a room for consolidated V4 policy towards 
Russia on EaP and especially on energy security matters, and these countries can 
influence certain aspects of the EU decision-making concerning Russia However, it 
is necessary to remember that the Visegrad Group can hardly be determined as an 
institutionalized integration group, but rather a regional forum and mechanism of 
political consultations The political dialogue is hampered by the conflict between 
Hungary and Slovakia
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RESEARCH METHOD ON PRINT 
AND ONLINE JOURNALISM TEXTS
Russiaу Belgorod State University 
soldofasi@maiL ru
In this paper presented theoretical and methodological approach to determining a 
quality o f journalism texts Our method mainly based on semiotic conception and theory o f  
text and involves terms and notions of these scientific fields
Nowadays people have unlimited access to print media, radio, TV, and most 
recently, worldwide network Internet The latter media, from semiotic point of 
view, is similar to every other except it combines TV, radio and newspapers in one 
system There is no doubt that modem media construct social paradigm and not 
only represent the world m their products but directly or indirectly influence 
society’s attitude to it
